# Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice

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# A Brief History of Elliptic Curve Cryptography

**1985-1987** Miller & Koblitz: elliptic curves can be used for public-key cryptography

**2000** Certicom: standards for ECC

**2006** NIST: standard for ECDSA

**2006** RFC 4492: ECC in TLS

2009 RFC 5656: ECC in SSH

2009 Nakamoto: Bitcoin

## Research Program

2. Profit?

1. Acquire keys.

## Acquiring keys

Port-scan the entire Internet.



2. Download bitcoin blockchain.



# The Good News

## People are actually using ECC!

- $\cdot pprox 10\% \text{ of SSH } ext{(1.2 million hosts)}$
- $\cdot \approx 7\%$  of TLS (2.2 million hosts)
- · All of bitcoin. (15 million public keys)

#### TLS curves

Curves (one vote per host that had a successful handshake):

```
2144467 (98.3%) secp256r1
2099848 (96.3%) null
1751780 (80.3%) secp384r1
 379638 (17.4%) secp521r1
  55000 (2.5%) sect233r1
  24860 (1.1%) sect163k1
  24233 (1.1%) secp224r1
  23355 (1.1%) secp192r1
  22847 (1.0%) sect193r1
  22846 (1.0%) sect193r2
      4 (0.0%) brainpoolP256r1
      4 (0.0%) brainpoolP384r1
      4 (0.0%) brainpoolP512r1
```

### SSH curves

```
1674663
        ecdh-sha2-nistp256
1672521
        ecdh-sha2-nistp521
1672486
         ecdh-sha2-nistp384
    ecdh-sha2-h/SsxnLCtRBh7I9ATyeB3A==
117
117
    ecdh-sha2-qcFQaMAMGhTziMT0z+Tuzw==
116
    ecdh-sha2-VqBg4QRPjxx1EXZdV0GdWQ==
116
    ecdh-sha2-5pPrSUQtIaTjUSt5VZNBjg==
    ecdh-sha2-9UzNcgwTlEnSCECZa7V1mw==
116
```

### Bitcoin curves

secp256k1

# The Less Good News

## Efficiency > security

Most TLS, SSH hosts support NIST curves in increasing order of security.

nistp256, nistp384, nistp521

#### Our SSH scan client supported only ECC cipher suites.

• 30,000 hosts sent us an RSA public key.

• 8,000 hosts sent us an *empty* public key.

- 500,000 hosts sent us a DSA public key.

# The Bad News

## Repeated public keys

- · 400,000 (30%) of SSH hosts serve non-unique ECDSA keys.
- · 200,000 (4%) of TLS ECDHE values non-unique.

## Cloud Hosting Issues

July 2013, Digital Ocean

Avoid duplicate SSH host keys

"The SSH host keys for some Ubuntu-based systems could have been duplicated by DigitalOcean's snapshot and creation process."

**5614** hosts served the public key contained in Digital Ocean's SSH setup guide.

### Repeated ECDSA Signature Nonces

**158** bitcoin addresses repeated signature nonces.

Address 1HKywxiL4JziqXrzLKhmB6a74ma6kxbSDj has stolen 59 **BTC**  $\approx$  3.6 **million rupees** from these addresses.

3 of these repeats due to Android Java RNG vulnerability.

#### **Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice**

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http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/734