# (Anonymous) Compact HIBE From Standard Assumptions 

Follow-up on the best paper award winner

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## Our Results

Two HIBEs from the IBE of Jutla and Roy [Asiacrypt 2013]

- Anonymous - $\mathfrak{A}$-CC-HIBE
- Non-anonymous - CC-HIBE
with
- constant size ciphertexts ( $3+1$ group elements)
- instantiation from Type-3 pairings
- adaptive security from static standard assumptions (SXDH)
- degradation independent of depth of HIBE $(O(q))$ which was not possible from previously known IBE schemes.


## Anonymous HIBE Schemes

| Scheme | [BW06] | $[$ SKOS09] | [DCIP10] | [PL13] | [LPL13],[RS13] | $\mathcal{A}$ - $C C$ - $-\mathcal{H I B E}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pairing | Type-1 | Composite | Composite | Type-1 | Type-3 | Type-3 |
| Security | selective-id | selective-id | adaptive-id | selective-id | adaptive-id | adaptive-id |
| Assump. | DLin,DBDH | $\ell$-wBDH*, <br> $\ell$-cDH | Subgroup <br> Decision | $h$-BDHE <br> Aug. $h$-DLin | LW1,LW2,DBDH <br> [LPL13]:3-DH,XDH <br> [RS13]:A1 | XDH |
| Deg. | $O(1)$ | $O(1)$ | $O(q)$ | $O(1)$ | $O(q)$ | $O(q)$ |
| \#pp | $\left(2\left(h^{2}+3 h+2\right), 1\right)$ | $(h+6,1)$ | $(h+4,1)$ | $(h+6,1)$ | $(3 h+6,1)$ | $(h+4,1)$ |
| \#msk | $h^{2}+5 h+7$ | $h+4$ | 2 | 4 | $h+6$ | $2 h+6$ |
| \#cpr | $2 h+5$ | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| \#key | $(h+3)(3 h-\ell+5)$ | $3(h-\ell+3)$ | $2(h-\ell+2)$ | $3(h-\ell+4)$ | $6(h-\ell+2)$ | $4(h-\ell)+10$ |
| Enc | $(2(\ell+3)(h+2)+1,1)$ | $(\ell+6,1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ | $(\ell+5,1)$ | $(3(\ell+2), 1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ |
| Dec | $2 h+3$ | 4 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| KGen | $h^{3}+h^{2}(5-\ell)+$ | $3 h-2 \ell+2$ | $4(h+2-3 \ell)(h+2(h-\ell+8)$ | $6 h-5 \ell+12$ | $2(2 h-2 \ell+5)$ |  |
| Deleg. | $5(7-3 \ell)-2 \ell+2$ | $5(h+2)(h+3)+1$ | $6(h-\ell)+214(h-\ell)+11$ | $(4(h-\ell)+25)$ | $2(h-\ell+3)$ | $4(h-\ell+5)$ |

$h$ : maximum depth; $\ell$ : length of the identity tuple; $q$ : no. of key-extract queries; Pairing: $e: \mathbb{G}_{1} \times \mathbb{G}_{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_{T} ; \mathcal{P} \mathcal{P}$ and ciphertexts in $\mathbb{G}_{1} ; \mathcal{M S K}$ and keys in $\mathbb{G}_{2}$.
$\# \mathrm{pp}=(a, b): a$ elements of $\mathbb{G}_{1}$ and $b$ elements of $\mathbb{G}_{T} ;$ Enc $=(a, b): a$ scalar multiplications (sm) in $\mathbb{G}_{1}$ and $b$ exps. in $\mathbb{G}_{T}$; Dec: \#pairings; KGen: \#sm in $\mathbb{G}_{2}$;

Deleg: $\# \mathrm{sm}$ in $\mathbb{G}_{2}$.

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| \#key | $(h+3)(3 h-\ell+5)$ | $3(h-\ell+3)$ | $2(h-\ell+2)$ | $3(h-\ell+4)$ | $6(h-\ell+2)$ | $4(h-\ell)+10$ |
| Enc | $(2(\ell+3)(h+2)+1,1)$ | $(\ell+6,1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ | $(\ell+5,1)$ | $(3(\ell+2), 1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ |
| Dec | $2 h+3$ | 4 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| KGen | $h^{3}+h^{2}(5-\ell)+$ | $3 h-2 \ell+2$ | $4(h+2-3 \ell)(h+2(h-\ell+8)$ | $6 h-5 \ell+12$ | $2(2 h-2 \ell+5)$ |  |
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[LPL13],[RS13] anonymity comes as a by-product of dual-system proof

## Anonymous HIBE Schemes

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| Assump. | DLin,DBDH | $\ell$-wBDH*, <br> $\ell$-cDH | Subgroup <br> Decision | $h$-BDHE <br> Aug. $h$-DLin | LW1,LW2,DBDH <br> LLPL13]:3-DH,XDH <br> [RS13]:A1 | XDH |
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| Enc | $(2(\ell+3)(h+2)+1,1)$ | $(\ell+6,1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ | $(\ell+5,1)$ | $(3(\ell+2), 1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ |
| Dec | $2 h+3$ | 4 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| KGen | $h^{3}+h^{2}(5-\ell)+$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $h(7-3 \ell)-2 \ell+2$ | $3 h-2 \ell+2$ | $4(h+2-3 \ell)(h+2(h-\ell+8)$ | $6 h-5 \ell+12$ | $2(2 h-2 \ell+5)$ |  |  |
| Deleg. | $5(h+2)(h+3)+1$ | $6(h-\ell)+214(h-\ell)+11$ | $(4(h-\ell)+25)$ | $2(h-\ell+3)$ | $4(h-\ell+5)$ |  |

[LPL13],[RS13] anonymity comes as a by-product of dual-system proof
JR-IBE structure supports non-anonymous HIBE with dual system proof

## Non-Anonymous HIBE Schemes

| Scheme | [BBG05] | [CS06] | [CS07] | [LW10] | CC- $\mathcal{H I B E}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pairing | Type-1 | Type-1 | Type-1 | Composite | Type-3 |
| Security | selective-id | adaptive-id | selective $^{-}$-id | adaptive-id | adaptive-id |
| Assump. | Decision <br> $h$-wBDHI | $h$-wDBDHI* | $h$-wDBDHI* | Subgroup <br> Decision | XDH |
| Deg. | 1 | $O\left(\left(k q 2^{N / k}\right)^{h}\right)$ | 1 | $O(q)$ | $O(q)$ |
| \#pp | $(h+4,0)$ | $(h+3+h k, 0)$ | $(2 h+3,1)$ | $(h+3,1)$ | $(3 h+9,1)$ |
| \#msk | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| \#cpr | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| \#key | $h-\ell+2$ | $(k+1)(h-\ell)+2$ | $2(h-\ell+1)$ | $h-\ell+2$ | $2(h-\ell)+5$ |
| Enc | $(\ell+2,1)$ | $(2,1)$ | $(\ell+2,1)$ | $(\ell+2,1)$ | $(\ell+4,1)$ |
| Dec | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| KGen | $h+2$ | $2(h-\ell+1)$ | $2 h-\ell+2$ | $2 h-\ell+4$ | $2 h+5$ |
| Deleg. | $\ell+2$ | $2(h-\ell)$ | $2 h-\ell+1$ | $2 h-\ell+6$ | $2 h+9$ |

Exact comparison with Chen and Wee [Crypto'13] (non-anonymous) compact HIBE from n-Lin assumptions not provided here.

Construction and proof present in the non-existent full version on ePrint!
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## Thank you!

